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The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce
International Whaling Agreements: A
Critical Perspective
DEAN M. WILKINSON*
Throughout history, humans have treated whales as a resource to be
exploited with little attention paid to conservation.1 The great whales
have literally been pursued to the ends of the earth and only after stocks
have been exhausted have the remnants of species been given a respite
from this relentless pursuit. Populations of bowhead whales in the Arctic
and humpback and blue whales in the Antarctic have become so depleted
that they are no longer commercially viable.
The commonly accepted genesis of commercial whaling took place
during the 11th Century, and involved Basque whalers who predomi-
nantly hunted right whales. There is at least some evidence, however,
which indicates that whaling by Flemings and Normans may predate that
of the Basques.2 Early whaling was conducted in coastal waters and con-
centrated on the slower moving species of whales. In the early 17th Cen-
tury, shore-based whaling for right whales was established in both the
American Colonies and Japan. By the end of the 18th Century, the
United States, Great Britain, France and Portugal all had pelagic fleets
hunting for sperm whales. The peak period for the legendary Yankee
whalers of Moby Dick fame was from 1820 to 1860.' These vessels sailed
oceans all over the world in pursuit of their quarry. The U. S. whaling
fleet peaked with 736 ships in 1846.' Although the worldwide take of
sperm whales in this period probably never exceeded 10,000, there is evi-
* Dean M. Wilkinson has been the Legislative Director of Greenpeace's Ocean Ecology
campaign. Among his duties were responsibilities for the Greenpeace Whaling campaign in
the United States. For the past three years Mr. Wilkinson has represented Greenpeace at
meetings of the Inter-agency Working Group helping develop United States policy for the
International Whaling Commission. Before joining Greenpeace, Mr. Wilkinson served six
years as Chief Legislative Assistant to Congressman Dale Kildee.
1. For a general background on the history of whaling, the following works are recom-
mended: J.N. TONNESSON & A. JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING (1982); P. BIR-
NIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO THE CON-
SERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE WATCHING (1985); FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
THE WHALE MANUAL (1987).
2. W. DeSmet, Evidence of Whaling in the North sea and English Channel During the
Middle Ages, in MAMMALS IN THE SEA 301-309 (1981).
3. R.C. Kugler, Historical Records of American Sperm Whaling, in MAMMALS IN THE
SEA (1981)(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Vol. III).
4. Gosho, Rice & Breiwick, The Sperm Whale, Physetermacrocephalis, 46 MARINE
FISHERIES REV. No. 4, at 60 (1984).
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
dence that the sperm whale's decline is linked to exploitation.' At the
same time, large numbers of right whales continued to be taken. It has
been estimated that over 6,000 were killed in 1846 alone.'
Despite the fact that whaling prior to the American Civil War was
conducted from open boats with hand-thrown harpoons, several popula-
tions of the slower-moving coastal whales were severely depleted in the
mid-19th Century. During the large 1860's a quantum leap in technology
occurred when steam-powered ships and harpoon cannon were intro-
duced. These developments allowed whalers to hunt previously unex-
ploited stocks of the much swifter blue and fin whales, known as rorquals.
The development of the factory processing ship in the early part of
this century opened up the Antarctic Ocean to the whalers. Despite
respites during the two world wars, by the end of the 1950's species such
as the blue whale, the humpback, and the fin whale were severely de-
pleted. Only after the larger whales became increasingly scarce did seri-
ous exploitation of the much smaller minke whale begin.
During the late 1960's and the 1970's a movement to "Save the
Whales" began to build. Using the media and the force of public opinion,
environmental and animal welfare groups pushed for an end to commer-
cial whaling. With startling speed they carried out what amounted to a
coup d'etat in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) - the inter-
national regulatory agency set up to control whaling. In 1982, the Com-
mission passed an amendment to its schedule setting up an indefinite
moratorium on commercial whaling to begin in 1986. As will be pointed
out below, however, passage of the moratorium did not end commercial
whaling.
In terms of public opinion in the United States, the battle to save the
whales has been won. The American public has made the decision that
commercial whaling is an unacceptable practice. It is no longer an issue in
possession of the chic, radical liberal element of American society. This
was perhaps most vividly illustrated when Greenpeace was contacted by
Representative Jack Kemp's campaign in early January 1988.
Unfortunately, the battle has not been won elsewhere, and the reac-
tion of the entrenched bureaucracy in the government of the United
States is that whaling is a bothersome issue which creates unnecessary
international friction. Even in one of the most accessible governments in
the world, the match between public attitudes and the translation of
those attitudes into official actions is not perfect.
Certainly the public concern over the status of whales is not mis-
placed. Eight of the nine species of great whales are listed as endangered
5. Id. at 61. By contrast, the average catch between 1956 and 1976 was over 20,000
animals annually and peaked at 29,255 in 1964.
6. Braham & Rice, The Right Whale, Balaena Glacialis, 46 MARINE FISHERIES REV. No.
4, at 42 (1984).
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under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. 7 They include the blue, bow-
head, fin, gray, humpback, right, sei, and sperm whales. 8 All of these spe-
cies, together with Bryde's whale and the minke whale (technically not a
great whale even though commercially exploited and regulated) are in se-
rious trouble.9 Some species are so depleted that they may never
recover.'
0
This situation has developed despite the existence of an international
regulatory body, the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which
was established under the 1946 International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling." The preamble to the Convention contains language
which is ironic in light of what eventually happened to the whale
populations:
Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding
for future generations the great natural resources represented by the
whale stocks; Considering the history of whaling has seen over-fishing
of one area after another to such a degree that it is essential to protect
all species of whales from further over-fishing . . ."
Instead of effectively regulating whaling activities, the IWC presided
over the decimation of one whale population after another. Quotas were
set which had no relation to the ability of a population to sustain losses.
The independent inquiry established by the government of Australia in
1978 described this process:
If the International Whaling Commission had adopted a more pru-
dent approach earlier in its history, whale stocks might now have been
significantly larger. As it is they have been excessively depleted ....
The gravest indictment of the International Whaling Commission
since its beginning is that it has presided over the decimation of blue
and humpback stocks and the severe depletion of most fin and sei and
some male sperm whale stocks.""
The utilization of scientific findings to establish quotas was not im-
7. U.S. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973). Species are listed at 50
C.F.R. § 17.11 (1987).
8. Id.
9. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
10. The International Whaling Commission classifies by species and genetically distinct
stocks. It sets three classifications: Initial Management Stocks, Sustained Management
Stocks, and Protected Stocks. Protected Stocks are those which are more than 10% below
maximum sustainable yield and roughly corresponds to the depleted status under the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1362. Every commercially exploited species
regulated by the IWC has stocks which are in protected status. Even the minke whale has
stocks which are in protected status such as the Northeast Atlantic stock and the Sea of
Japan - Yellow Sea - East China Sea stock.
11. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 [hereinafter Convention].
12. Id.
13. Id. at 91
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mune from political pressure, and in virtually every instance of uncer-
tainty, the decision was made on the side of higher quotas.' Jeremy
Cherfas, who has covered the IWC for several years for the British publi-
cation New Scientist, commented, "The simple fact is that although the
IWC is supposed to base its management on science, it failed for a long
time to adopt the suggestions of the majority of its scientists .... And
even where scientists were quite certain, and quite unanimous, the IWC
did not always listen."'" In some cases formulas used to generate popula-
tion estimates were blatantly altered to allow continued whaling despite
evidence of serious depletion.' The politicizing and abuse of science as
relating to whales continues to this day.
Commercial whaling peaked in the 1961-1962 season, when 67,000
whales were killed.' By the mid-1960s it was generally recognized that
the IWC had not lived up to the goals it had set for itself. Despite a
situation which was acknowledged as serious, unrealistic quotas continued
to be set and one population of whales after another became depleted.
Not until 1972 did the IWC undertake an effort to regulate kill by species
14. Sidney Holt, a long-time member of the IWC's Scientific Committee, described
what all too often occurred: "[Bliological productivity is not negotiable. Time and again we
have seen situations in which the present annual catch level might be, say 5,000 animals,
scientists have said their best guess of the sustainable yield is, say 2,000, and the next catch
has been set at 3,500 with a flurry of publicity about how responsible and conciliatory the
authorities have been -and what great sacrifices the industry has made! When, as so often
has been the case, the scientists got it wrong, and the number should have been closer to
1,000, the situation is doubly tragic. And any lack of consensus among scientists may be
taken as the excuse to do nothing drastic this year." S. Holt, Mammals in the Sea, 15 AMBIO
No. 3, 132 (1986).
15. JEREMY CHERFAS, THE HUNTING OF THE WHALE: A TRAGEDY THAT MUST END 147-
148 (1988). One of the most blatant examples of the use of political pressure occurred in
1959 when several nations indicated that they would withdraw from the Convention unless
quotas were raised. The Chairman indicated that an increase of quotas would actually have
a beneficial effect. The Chairman's Report said, "Conscious of the importance of maintain-
ing the Convention, the Commission showed a willingness to consider making some increase
in the Antarctic catch if thereby the loss of those member countries which had given notice
of withdrawal could be averted," quoted in FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, THE WHALE MANUAL 25
(1978).
16. As an example, the traditional means of stock populations has been catch per unit
effort (CPUE). Obviously, the development of new technologies can affect the formula.
Before CPUE was recently discredited as a means of measuring population size for whale
stocks, any change in basic formulas was subject to debate and political bargaining. The
introduction of a new sonar termed ASDIC for detecting sperm whales was variously esti-
mated to increase efficiency by anywhere from 38 to 130 percent. Japanese scientists main-
tained that efficiency was only increased by 5 percent and even had boats reporting a nega-
tive correlation. Eventually, the Commission decided in a special meeting in Tokyo in 1977
that a 16 percent increase would be the factor used. Population estimates were then in-
creased with the result that the quota was raised by over 5,000 whales. See M'Gonigle, The
Economizing of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 119, 152 & 157-
158 (1980); Holt, A Review of Current Whale Harvesting Strategies, in WHALES AND WHAL-
ING 41 (1985).
17. GREENPEACE, WILDLIFE FACT SHEET ON WHALES 3 (1986).
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and geographic region. 8 Time and time again members of the Commis-
sion itself have been critical of its record. The Mexican Commissioner
eloquently expressed this feeling, stating: "This Commission will be
known to history as a small body of men who failed to act responsibly in
terms of a very large commitment to the world and who protected the
interests of a few whalers and not the future of thousands of whales." 9
More recently, at the 1986 meeting of the IWC, four of the most
respected whale scientists in the world issued a paper which expressed
continuing concern and concluded that the IWC was judged by the world
on its stewardship of the blue, fin, sei, and humpback whales, and found
guilty on all charges of negligence. In 1974 when the IWC adopted a new
management policy, it was released on parole. The final judgment will be
based on the Commission's treatment of the minke whale.
The deplorable state of whale conservation efforts has often been
used as an example of what has been called "the tragedy of the com-
mons." In fact, Garrett Hardin made reference to them in his initial arti-
cle on this subject:
[T]he oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the
philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automati-
cally to the shibboleth of the 'freedom of the seas.' Professing to be-
lieve in the 'inexhaustible resources of the oceans,' they bring species
after species of fish and whales closer to extinction.0
The Australian commission made reference to this problem and the
pressures it created:
Most cetacea migrate extensively and, apart from some stocks of the
smaller cetacea, could not be said to belong to any particular countries
rather than to the world as a whole. There is thus pressure on each
whaling nation to set substantial quotas and to take the largest possi-
ble share of these generally to the detriment of the whale stock, other
nations and even the long-term efficiency of its own industry.
It should be noted, however, that given the structural defects in the
Convention such a result was almost inevitable. These defects are com-
mon to many international regulatory regimes and have implications be-
yond the whaling issue. As an example, similar problems may make effec-
tive management of fish resources impossible.2"
The Convention requires an extraordinary majority before any
changes can be made in the quotas. Article III, paragraph 2 requiring a
majority of three-fourths of the members voting in order to make changes
18. M'Gonigle, The Economizing of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 142 (1980).
19. D.G. Chapman, W. de la Mare, S.J. Holt, and R. Payne, distributed at the 38th
annual meeting of the IWC in Malmo, Sweden (June 8, 1986)(unpublished statement).
20. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE Dec. 13, 1968, at 1245.
21. WHALES AND WHALING, supra note 16 at 95.
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to the schedule.22 In actual application, this provision has meant that vir-
tual unanimity is required before any changes in quotas can be made.
Under such circumstances, decisions have been made which were detri-
mental to efforts to conserve stocks. Fortunately, the requirement for a
three-fourths majority now makes the resumption of commercial whaling
difficult. The moratorium on commercial whaling passed in the 1982
meeting of the IWC2" will require the same margin if it is to be over-
turned. As the whaling bloc becomes smaller, the odds of obtaining the
votes necessary to resume commercial whaling diminish.
The second provision of the Convention which makes effective man-
agement of stocks difficult is that which provides a one-nation veto of
IWC decisions. Article V, paragraph 3 provides that any nation may lodge
an objection to any quota schedule changes within 90 days bound by
those without being changes.24 This procedure has been used to avoid
otherwise applicable quotas, to reject the classification of stocks where
such classification would reduce whaling activities, and even to ignore
IWC decisions on standards for humane killing. An example of the latter
scenario occurred recently when Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the
Soviet Union lodged objections to the 1981 decision banning the use of
the cold harpoon.25 This and similar situations indicate that it is possible
for a minority of one to decide the conservation program of the Commis-
sion. Such a worst-case scenario has occurred. When the IWC voted 25-1
for a zero quota on male sperm whales in the North Pacific, the dissent-
ing country, Japan, lodged an objection and continued whaling.26
The third structural defect in the Convention is void of any provi-
sions for enforcement. In an examination of international regulatory re-
gimes for marine mammals, Patricia Birnie observed, "Effective enforce-
ment is crucial; however good the measures prescribed, they are useless if
not enforced. 217 Almost comically, a provision for enforcement of the
Convention was removed from the final draft at the insistence of the
United States,2" and had the provision remained, the United States would
not have been forced to become the policeman for the IWC. Jeremy
Cherfas has termed the United States role in the drafting the Convention
"fine irony." He comments "[T]he only effective sanctions to implement
decisions of the IWC are provided by the U.S. America pulled the IWC's
22. Convention, supra note 11, at art. III, para. 4.
23. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, at
13, para. 10(e)(1987)(schedule).
24. Convention, supra note 11, at art. V, para. 3.
25. Zimmerman, Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement: The Supreme Court Gives Credence
to an Aberration in American Cetacean Society III, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. R. 257, 265, n.44
(1987).
26. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Chairman's Report of the 33rd Meeting of July 21-25, 1981,
at 8-9 (1982) (Cambridge, U.K. : International Whaling Commission).
27. Birnie, The Role of Law in Protecting Marine Mammals, 15 AMBO 137 (1986).
28. Interview with Thomas Garrett, former Deputy Commissioner for the United States
and Acting Commissioner for the United States to the IWC (April 15, 1988).
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teeth in the first place, and America now provides the IWC's dentition. '29
One provision of the Convention has received a great deal of atten-
tion recently. Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Convention provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any con-
tracting government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit
authorizing that nation to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of
scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and sub-
ject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government sees fit,
and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the
provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this
Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the
Commission all such authorizations which it has granted."0
The authors of the Convention would have had to be exceptionally
prescient to realize that this provision would eventually be a major loop-
hole utilized to undermine conservation decisions. At the time, nobody
could have foreseen serious limits on quotas for any species and a morato-
rium on commercial whaling would have been beyond belief. Certainly
Article VIII has been used in the past to continue commercial operations
when there was a zero quota on specific stocks. As an example, Japan
issued its whalers a permit to kill 240 Bryde's whales in 1976 despite a
zero quota for the stock.3 1 It was not until the moratorium on commercial
whaling became effective that efforts to exploit this loophole became sys-
tematic. In 1985, both Iceland and South Korea submitted research pro-
posals to the IWC's Scientific Committee."2 Iceland's program proposed a
take of 80 fin whales, 80 minke whales, and 40 sei whales annually over a
five year period. South Korea proposed a take of 200 minkes from a
population which was already so depleted that such a take was probably
beyond the realm of possibility.' In April, 1987, within a week of a much-
publicized end to commercial whaling in the Antarctic, Japan submitted a
research proposal for taking 825 minke whales and 50 sperm whales an-
nually over a ten-year period.35 Norway submitted a five-year "research"
29. CHERFAS, supra note 15, at 113.
30. Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
31. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Special Permits for Scientific Research, (Jan. 5, 1987) (Cir-
cular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Governments). This communica-
tion contains requests for special permits by year and the number taken subsequent to such
permits. It should be noted that the United States has used this same loophole. Between
1966 and 1969, the United States took 290 protected gray whales under special permits at a
time when its whaling operation based in Richmond, California, was failing. For a discussion
of the history of the abuse of scientific permits, see GREENPEACE, SCIENTIFIC WHALERS? THE
HISTORY OF WHALING UNDER SPECIAL PERMITS (1985).
32. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC, [1985] SC/37/020 and SC/37/
027 revised.
33. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC, [1987] SC/37/020.
34. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg., Report of the Scientific Committee, at 31-32
(1986)(Agenda items 5.4.2 and 5.4.3).
35. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
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proposal at the IWC meeting in 1988.36 On its face, the Norwegian propo-
sal looks fairly innocuous. The first year of the program would only in-
volve the taking of 35 minke whales. Buried in the proposal, however, is
the intention to take more than 150 whales per year in the subsequent
years of the program. The proposal states:
[Ilt can only be suggested that unless a biopsy technique can be
adopted for the purpose a comparative study of genetic variation may
necessitate a take of about 50 minke whales from each stock unit
which is to be included in the analysis. It is anticipated, however, that
continued studies of temporal and spatial food selection and intake
may require an annual sampling of even larger numbers throughout
the program period, i.e. each of the years from 1989 to 1992."7
It should be emphasized that these so-called research proposals are
only thinly-veiled attempts to get around the moratorium. As early as
1984 a Japanese official was quoted as saying that research whaling in the
Antarctic was a possible way of continuing operations during the morato-
rium.3 8 Some of these proposals do not meet even minimal scientific stan-
dards. Perhaps the most egregious example is the Japanese proposal for
taking large male sperm whales in the Antarctic. 9 The justification for
this proposal was that the stomach contents of whales need to be ex-
amined. For over a century, it has been known that the primary prey
species of sperm whales is squid. Furthermore, there is a huge quantity of
data in both Japan and the Soviet Union on the stomach contents of
sperm whales. When asked why they did not simply analyze the available
data from past kills, a Japanese scientist participating in the meeting of
the Scientific Committee responded that they were really interested in
what the squid were eating. Certainly there are easier ways of catching
squid than by cutting open the stomachs of sperm whales. When ques-
tioned further, the Japanese scientist admitted that there was not a spe-
cialist in squid biology on their team."'
The abuse of the research whaling provision has become the most
pressing issue for the IWC. This was expressed eloquently by Dan Mc-
Govern, NOAA General Counsel, during 1987's IWC meeting, stating:
Are we prepared as a Commission.to address the question of what is
important and legitimate scientific research that involves the killing of
whales? It is, I submit, the question of the day, of the week, and for
(Mar. 1987).
36. INST MARINE RES., A PROGRAM TO STUDY AND MONITOR NORTHEAST ATLANTIC MINKE
WHALES, 1988-1992, at 26 (Mar. 16, 1988).
37. Id.
38. Int'l. Her. Trib., Aug. 3, 1984, at 2.
39. Government of Japan, supra note 23.
40. Affidavit prepared by Roger S. Payne, Oct. 9, 1987. The affidavit was prepared but
never submitted when the original plaintiffs attempted to reopen the case. See American
Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985), 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
and Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
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this organization, the only question of great consideration at this
meeting. If you are prepared to turn your back on this question, then
you are prepared to turn your back on the moratorium, because the
moratorium can be escaped very easily by claiming that the killing of
whales is simply for scientific purposes."'
In the debate over Article VIII and in the provisions of Article III
and Article V the issue of national sovereignty is particularly significant.
It might be maintained that in the management of common resources,
national sovereignty must be subsumed - otherwise the exhaustion of
the resource becomes virtually inevitable. This problem is important in
areas other than whaling. There are significant problems with the man-
agement of fish in both the North Atlantic and North Pacific.4 Even the
Antarctic is not immune. Two species of fish, the Antarctic cod
(Notothenia rossii) and the icefish (Champocephalus gunnari) have be-
come commercially nonviable because of the inability of the countries in
the CCAMLR Convention to regulate fish takes until after stocks have
already been annihilated." The treatment of the high seas as a commons
subject to maximum exploitation also has impact on stocks within the
200-mile zone, since fish do not respect man-made boundaries, and hence
move back and forth between the high seas and coastal waters. Neither
straddling stocks (fish which inhabit waters both inside and outside the
200-mile zone) nor anadramous stocks (fish which seasonally move be-
tween coastal waters and the high seas) can be managed if there are no
limits on the high seas take."' Only effective international management
regimes can assure the maintenance of productive fish stocks. The trag-
edy of the whales will be repeated again and again if a blind devotion to
41. Remarks by D. McGovern, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC (June 24, 1987)
(unpublished transcripts).
42. During the last two years there have been confrontations between Canadian author-
ities and French and U.S. vessels in the Georges Bank region. Historically such stocks as
herring, cod, and yellowtail flounder have collapsed in the Northwest Atlantic. There have
also been difficulties in setting cod quotas in the North Sea. In the Bering Sea, catches of
groundfish in an area of international waters termed the "doughnut hole" and evidence that
foreign vessels were poaching on the boundary of that region led to hearings in the Senate in
early 1988 and were the subjects of subsequent rule-making. 53 Fed. Reg. 13,410-12, 13,422-
24 (1988).
43. Office of Science and Technology, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat'l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Directed Research Antarctic Marine Living
Resources: AMLR A Program Development Plan, at 17 (Jan. 1986); Sherman & Ryan,
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 31 OCEANus 2, 59 (Summ. 1988).
44. Straddling stocks are those stocks whose range extends across boundaries and
anadramous stocks are those which move from one area to another at different times. As an
example of the first, pollock stocks in the Bering Sea extend into an area of international
waters called the "doughnut hole" from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Heavy
catches in the portion of the range, which is unregulated, can make management of the
stock within the EEZ difficult. As an example of the latter, salmon spend much of their life
cycle on the high seas returning to rivers to spawn. See Statement of Ambassador Edward
E. Wolfe, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Apr. 30, 1987.
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national sovereignty produces conventions under which consensus is re-
quired or under which one nation may subvert a conservation regime by
lodging an objection or under which there is no possibility for
enforcement.
With the realization that the great whales were in danger of extinc-
tion and the IWC was ineffective in preserving whale stocks, public pres-
sure began to build for domestic laws which could force compliance with
IWC decisions. In 1971, both the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate passed resolutions asking for an end to commercial whaling."
In 1971, the Pelly amendment was added to the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act."' The motivation behind the measure was a fisheries problem -
Denmark refused to abide by limits on the Atlantic salmon catch. How-
ever, Congressman Pelly mentioned the whaling issue when it was
brought to the floor.4
The Pelly amendment provides a two step process in providing sanc-
tions for activities which "diminish the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program." The first step is a certification by the Sec-
retary of Commerce. Upon receipt of the certification, the President has
sixty days in which to determine whether all, a portion, or none of the
fish products from the offending country shall be prohibited. It should be
noted that the second step in the process is entirely discretionary. It is
incumbent on the President that he report the reasons to the Congress
only if he chooses not to impose a total embargo on the offending coun-
try's fisheries exports. Despite ample opportunity, the Pelly amendment
has never been used to enforce a convention dealing with fish. It has,
however, been used eight times to help bolster the IWC.
Often overlooked in its significance was the passage in 1972 of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).4 8 The MMPA placed a mora-
torium on the importation of products containing marine mammal prod-
ucts. Until that time, whale products were used in a wide range of com-
modities. Because the United States represents such a significant part of
the market for virtually any international commodity, the moratorium
produced a significant change in the pattern of utilization of whale prod-
ucts. Whale bone, oil, and baleen are no longer the primary goal of the
hunt. Today, the main use of whales is as a source of meat for human
consumption. The passage of the MMPA restricted market opportunities
for whale products, but it did not limit the use of whales for food.
By 1979, it was realized that the Pelly amendment had not been ef-
fective in limiting whaling activities, and there was dissatisfaction with
the amount of discretion it allowed. A new amendment to the Fisheries
45. S. Res. 115, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. Con. Res. 387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
46. Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (codified at 22 U.S.C 1978).
47. 117 CONG. REC. H34752 (1971)(statement by Rep. Pelly).
48. Pub. L. No.92-522, 86 Stat. 1027, (codified at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1361-1407).
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Conservation and Management Act was passed into law. The Packwood-
Magnuson amendment applies explicitly to the IWC and removes any
discretion in the imposition of sanctions."9 Upon certification by the Sec-
retary of Commerce, any quota for fishing in the United States fishery
conservation zone is immediately cut by 50 percent. If the offense contin-
ues after a year, the quota is reduced by 100 percent. Again, the operative
language is an action which "diminishes the effectiveness. 0
The provisions of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments
have been used in three different ways. The first of these is to enforce
quotas. On November 12, 1974, Japan and the Soviet Union were certified
under Pelly for exceeding minke whale quotas.5 1 On January 16, 1975,
President Ford informed Congress that he was not imposing sanctions
because both countries had agreed to abide by quotas in the future.2 On
April 1, 1985, the Soviet Union was again certified for exceeding minke
whale quotas in the Antarctic." In the following year whaling during a
moratorium was added as an offence, although technically being a quota
violation. The Packwood-Magnuson amendment required an immediate
reduction in fishing allocations but at roughly 20 million dollars, the allo-
cations were insignificant. President Reagan chose not to impose Pelly
sanctions.14 At the next meeting of the IWC the Soviet Union announced
that it would suspend commercial whaling activities in the Antarctic at
the end of the 1986-87 season "for technical reasons. '55 Only last April
the Soviet Union formally confirmed that it has ceased commercial whal-
ing. On April 27, 1988, the certification was formally lifted.'
On June 9, 1986, Secretary Baldrige certified Norway under the Pelly
amendment for taking minke whales from the Northeast Atlantic stock.
5 7
Having no fish allocations in U.S. waters, Norway was not subject to the
Packwood-Magnuson amendment. Norway's action amounted to a double
violation. First, the minke whale stock in question has been so depleted
that it had been designated a protection stock with a zero quota. Second,
the whaling took place during the commercial moratorium. On July 3,
Norway announced that it would cease commercial whaling at the end of
the 1987 season. It qualified that statement, however. In a statement re-
49. Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (codified at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1821(e)(2)).
50. Pub. L. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (codified at 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1821 (e)(2)(A)(i)).
51. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent to President Gerald Ford (No-
vember 12, 1974).
52. Report from President Gerald Ford to the Congress of the United States (Jan. 16,
1975).
53. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm BaIdrige to President Ronald Reagan
(Apr. 1, 1985).
54. President's Message to Congress Reporting on the Whaling Activities of the Soviet
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 704 (May 31, 1985).
55. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of IWC, IWC/37/OS (Opening statement
of I.V. Nikonoriv, Commissioner for the U.S.S.R.).
56. 53 Fed. Reg. 15,104 (1988).
57. Letter from Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, to President Ronald Reagan
(June 9, 1986).
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leased on the same day the Prime Minister's office stated: "The right is
reserved to implement such measures as are deemed necessary to limit
practical, operational disturbances to fisheries caused by the temporary
suspension of (ordinary) whaling operations.""8 Such a reservation was
rather disquieting to environmentalists who had heard Norwegians blame
the depleted stock of whales for reductions in fish catches.
Further, even before determining what sort of research might be nec-
essary, the same statement announced that whaling would continue under
the guise of science. "Norway will continue work on scientific surveys of
whale stocks, i.e., by employing some vessels in scientifically based whal-
ing."'59 On August 4, President Reagan issued a decision not to impose
sanctions saying that the Norwegian announcement ."contemplates com-
pliance" with the IWC conservation program.6"
From each of these instances, precedent reflected that even a legal
objection to a quota under Article V of the Convention could diminish
the effectiveness of the conservation regime. If the Reagan Administra-
tion's stand on this issue were to be distilled into boilerplate language it
might read: "Even though the objection(s) release . . .from any treaty
obligation to observe the quota(s), the taking of more . . . whales than
permitted under quota(s) is inconsistent with the international conserva-
tion standard . .. 61
The second general category for certification has been non- member-
ship in the regulatory body. In the mid-1970s, it was realized that whaling
outside the Convention was undermining attempts to limit whaling activi-
ties. Member countries were providing financing for and importing prod-
ucts from pirate whaling operations and whaling operations run by non-
member countries."2 Numerical quotas and the listing of protection stocks
would have no impact if the whaling effort was carried on outside the
regulatory regime. The situation became serious enough that the IWC
passed resolutions between 1976 and 1978 inviting non-member countries
to join, and urging them to cease activities which would result in quotas
being exceeded.63 Beginning in 1976, the United States warned several
nations that if they failed to join the IWC, they would be subject to sanc-
tions.6 4 On December 14, 1978, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps cer-
tified Peru, Chile, and the Republic of Korea for whaling outside of the
58. Press release issued from the Office of the Prime Minister (July 3, 1986).
59. Id.
60. President's Message to Congress, Weekly Comparative Presidential Documents
1046 (Aug. 4, 1986).
61. Id.
62. See generally D. DAY, THE WHALE WAR (1987) (Chapters 5 & 7) and the annual
publications published by Greenpeace for each IWC meeting from 1978 to 1984, entitled
Outlaw Whalers.
63. Background document accompanying letter from Juanita Keps, Secretary of Com-
merce, to President Jimmy Carter 3 (Dec. 14, 1978).
64. Id. at 4.
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Convention. 5 On February 13, 1979, President Carter announced that he
was not imposing Pelly sanctions because the offending countries were
becoming parties to the Convention. 6
The most recent certification of Japan on February 9, 1988 has cre-
ated a new certification category.67 In 1987, the conservation bloc within
the IWC employed a new tactic to counter the growing abuse of Article
VIII of the Convention and the use of "scientific research" to cloak com-
mercial whaling operations. Article VI of the Convention provides: "The
Commission may from time to time make recommendations to any or all
Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whal-
ing and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention." '
At the 1987 annual meeting of the IWC this provision was used to
examine and then make recommendations on all of the outstanding re-
search proposals. On June 26, 1988, resolutions were passed which stated
that because of serious scientific uncertainties, the Republic of Korea,
Iceland, and Japan were requested to refrain from issuing or to revoke
permits issued under the proposals." Such resolutions are non-binding,
but it should be noted that the proponents assumed that non-compliance
would trigger certification under U.S. law. A failure to abide by a Com-
mission recommendation could certainly be interpreted as "diminishing
the effectiveness" of the Convention even if such a recommendation was
non-binding.
There are a number of reasons why such an assumption seemed war-
ranted. First, U.S. actions on whaling activities carried out under objec-
tion to quotas indicated that it was not necessary for a country to be in
technical violation of the Convention before certification took place. Sec-
ond, the actions of the U.S. Commissioner, Dr. Anthony Calio, signalled
that this would be a likely scenario. Dr. Calio had indicated on several
occasions that if the moratorium was to be effective, some controls would
have to be placed on whaling under special permits.70 At the instigation
of Dr. Calio, the Commission had passed a resolution sponsored by the
United States on the previous day establishing criteria which the Scien-
tific Committee should use in examining research proposals.7 ' Although
the resolution set out only very minimal criteria, it was bitterly opposed
65. Letter from Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, to President Jimmy Carter
(Dec. 14, 1978).
66. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, 1 PUB. PAPERS 266 (Feb.
13, 1979).
67. Letter from C. William Verity, Secretary of Commerce, to President Ronald Reagan
(Feb. 9, 1988).
68. Convention, supra note 3, at art. VI.
69. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 41-45 (1987).
70. Letter from Anthony J. Calio, United States Commissioner to the International
Whaling Commission, to Dr. Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commis-
sion (Aug. 21, 1986); and letter from Anthony J. Calio to Craig Van Note of the Monitor
Consortium (Aug. 7, 1987).
71. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 24 (1987).
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by the whaling bloc which argued that any scientific standards should be
determined by the country issuing the permit.
After the individual resolutions were passed in 1987, each of the
countries faced a difficult decision, and each responded in a different
fashion. The Republic of Korea observed the recommendation and re-
frained from whaling, but both Iceland and Japan chose the path of con-
frontation. Between late July and early September, there was a serious
diplomatic confrontation between the United States and Iceland over the
latter's choice to ignore the recommendation and continue its fin whale
hunt. In September, a bilateral agreement was made which permitted Ice-
land to complete a reduced sei whaling operation in return for a commit-
ment to submit a revised research program at this year's meeting of the
IWC and to abide by the recommendations of the Scientific Committee.7"
The latter provision may have been a serious tactical error. The Scientific
Committee makes few unequivocal recommendations. What normally
emerges is something which reads: "Some say X, others say non-X." As
an example of how Scientific Committee recommendations can be inter-
preted in different ways, even after the revised research proposal submit-
ted by Japan was thoroughly discredited in a special meeting of the Sci-
entific Committee in December, 1988'7 spokesmen for the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries stated that there was no substantive
opposition to the proposal. 4
Japan chose a different route. When they were informed that they
would be certified if they went ahead with their program to kill 825
minke whales and 50 sperm whales in the Antarctic, they postponed the
program and submitted a revised "feasibility study" for the program
which entailed lethal research on 300 minkes.7 5 They asked for expedited
consideration of this new proposal7 and there was a special meeting of
the Scientific Committee on December 15-17, 1988 in Cambridge, Eng-
land. After that meeting, the United Kingdom requested a postal ballot
on a resolution similar to the three passed the previous summer request-
ing that Japan not go ahead with its program. 77 Despite the fact that seri-
72. Exchange of letters between Bruce Smart, Acting Secretary of Commerce, and
Hordur Bjarnason, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of Iceland (Sept. 14-16,
1987).
73. Payne, Review of the IWC Scientific Committee Report on Japan's Feasibility
Study for Scientific Whaling, (Dec. 22, 1987) (unpublished paper prepared for World Wild-
life Fund).
74. See Japan's 'Scientific' Whaling Draws International Fire, Asahi Evening News
(Tokyo), Jan. 12, 1981, at 1; Whaling Fleet to Set Sail, Mainichi Daily News, Dec. 20, 1987,
at 12.
75. Government of Japan, Research Plan for the Feasibility Study on the Program for
Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke and for Preliminary Research on the Marine
Ecosystem in the Antarctic (Oct. 1987).
76. Int'l. Whaling Comm'n., 40th Mtg., at 33 (1988).
77. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., Result of Postal Vote Proposed by the United
Kingdom, (Feb. 15, 1988) (Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Gov-
ernments). Argentina which was recorded as not voting had difficulty getting its ballot to
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ous scientific problems remained, and despite the fact that the ballot was
in process, Japanese ships began whaling in the Antarctic."8 When Secre-
tary Verity received verification that whales had been taken, Japan was
certified under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments. 9 On
February 15, 1988, the results of the postal ballot were announced with
nineteen in favor of and six opposed to the United Kingdom resolution. 0
Rather than taking action to mitigate the offense, Japan brazenly ex-
pressed its contempt for both the United States and the IWC and an-
nounced that it was going to continue its whaling operations.8 ' On April
6, President Reagan announced that he was not going to sanction Japan
under the Pelly amendment but would immediately end all Japanese fish-
ing allocation within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. There
was also an indication that the issue would be revisited by December 1,
1988, when Japanese actions in the interim would be assessed. The sanc-
tions amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. Japan will not
receive allocations for 3,000 tons of sea snails and 5,000 tons of Pacific
whiting. 2 At the 1988 meeting of the IWC, resolutions were again passed
expressing dissatisfaction with both the Norwegian proposal and Iceland's
research.83
There are indications that the United States has backed off its deter-
mination to use Article VI as a means of controlling "research" whaling.
Twice bilateral agreements have been made with Iceland where the
United States has unilaterally decided that they have made adjustments
which legitimized research projects, and the United States indicated to
Norway that it was willing to take a similar action on their program. In
all three instances, the government of the United States acted unilater-
ally in the face of decisions made by the IWC. It is certainly open to
question whether the United States can maintain that the offending
countries' actions are not diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC, in
light of the explicit vote on a specific project noted above.
In an argument approaching sophistry, the United States has main-
tained that any alteration in a research proposal changes the conditions
of a resolution. In essence, they have said that a resolution applies only to
the explicit proposal being considered and any alteration of the proposal
creates a new proposal which was not considered by the Scientific Com-
mittee. In each of the resolutions, reference is made to uncertainties iden-
the Commission and later recorded the 20th vote in favor of the U.K. resolution.
78. Won't Recall Whalers: Government, Mainichi Daily News, Jan. 25, 1988, at 1.
79. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Feb. 9, 1988).
80. See Result of Postal Vote, supra note 78.
81. Won't Recall Whalers: Government, Mainichi Daily News, Jan. 25, 1988, at 1.
82. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Reporting on
Japanese Whaling Activities, Weekly Comparative Presidential Documents at 438 (Apr. 6,
1988).
83. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 32-34 (1988).
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tified by the Scientific Committee. Rather than allowing the Scientific
Committee to determine whether or not these uncertainties have been re-
solved, the government of the United States has arrogated itself the
power to make that determination unilaterally.
In a meeting on July 15, 1988, James Brennan, Assistant Administra-
tor for Fisheries, indicated that the passage of a resolution (or conceiva-
bly even an amendment to the Convention itself) would not necessarily
result in the finding that a violation would trigger certification. He said,
"It doesn't work to abdicate the national responsibility to an interna-
tional body. '84 Ironically, the same argument has been used to justify
continued whaling activity.
There are some common threads to each of the certifications. In no
instance have Pelly sanctions actually been applied. Even in the two in-
stances where the Packwood-Magnuson amendment has been applied, the
economic penalties were minor. In every case except the most recent,
however, the offending country has made at least a token effort toward
correcting the offense. Only Japan has been totally defiant.
The current situation with Japan illustrates a problem with the use
of domestic law to enforce an international regulatory regime. In the face
of a truly intransigent nation, both domestic and international political
considerations become major factors. The government must be willing to
accept the inevitable friction which will develop if sanctions are applied.
Domestically, the executive branch has always indicated concern that an
embargo on fish products would precipitate a retaliatory embargo on U.S.
fish exports. Over the last two years, Japan has twice threatened to cut
off U.S. fish exports and used this threat as leverage to forestall U.S. ac-
tion. Obviously, the 1.5 billion dollars in fish exports to Japan are a major
economic concern, and U.S. fishermen begin to pressure the Administra-
tion whenever such a possibility arises. Furthermore, Japan possesses po-
litical leverage because of investment in joint venture fishing operations
with American companies in the North Pacific. In essence, there is a pow-
erful group of U.S. fishermen willing to lobby for Japan on virtually any
issue effecting fisheries.
As often is the case between militarily-allied nations, the friction
which develops over what many leaders view as a relatively minor issue
(such as whaling) is treated as an irritant to be removed at all costs. It
therefore comes as no surprise that the Western allies have been reluctant
to criticize one another's violations of the Convention.
In November, 1984, Japan began whaling on sperm whales in the
North Pacific in violation of a zero quota. Rather than certify Japan at a
time Japan had a 500 million dollar fishery allocation, the United States
struck a deal with Japan permitting an extra two seasons of whaling in
the Antarctic after the onset of the moratorium and, an extra two seasons
84. Briefing conducted by James Brennan (July 15, 1988).
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of coastal whaling on minke and Bryde's whales and three years of sperm
whaling in the North Pacific. In return, Japan agreed to abide by the
moratorium on commercial whaling after these periods expired. The Bal-
drige-Murazumi Agreement took the form of an exchange of letters be-
tween Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Charge d'Affaires Murazumi
of the Japanese embassy in Washington. s" It was clear that the Depart-
ment of Commerce thought that they had gained a commitment from the
Japanese government to effectively cease their whaling activities. In light
of subsequent Japanese actions, the Agreement is an embarrassment to
the Administration. In addition to trying to get around the commercial
moratorium in the Antarctic by mounting a dubious research whaling op-
eration, the Japanese subsequently asked the IWC to relabel its coastal
whaling operation, which was implicitly acknowledged to be commercial
in the Agreement, as an aboriginal/subsistence hunt which would not be
subject to the moratorium."s
Christopher Gibson pointed out that the practical effect of the Japa-
nese agreement was to make every departure from IWC guidelines subject
to bilateral negotiations and that potentially all enforcement could be
undermined.
The United States has provided enforcement leverage for IWC quotas
through the Pelly and Packwood Magnuson Amendments. Most whal-
ing nations, therefore, have based - or will base - their decisions on
whether or not to observe an IWC quota on their assessment of the
United States' intentions. They will watch to see whether the United
States actually imposes the sanctions written in its laws .... Now that
the United States has entered into a bilateral agreement with Japan
that circumvents the IWC limits under which Japan may whale under
objection' without being certified other whaling nations . . . may de-
mand similar concessions.8
85. Exchange of letters between Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Charge
d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of Japan Yasushi Murazumi (Nov. 13, 1984).
86. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., Chairman's Report, at 22-26 (June 1987) (The
action illustrates one of the roles of non-governmental organizations within the IWC. Be-
yond lobbying such organizations provide information. In the past, they have exposed viola-
tions and pirate whaling operations. In anticipation of the Japanese proposal, the Humane
Society of the United States sponsored a study of the commercial nature of Japanese coastal
whaling operation. Their report was distributed at the 1987 meeting and played a role in the
failure of the Japanese to gain passage of their proposal. See THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES, SMALL-TYPE COMMERCIAL WHALING IN JAPAN (June, 1987). The report pre-
cipitated a rebuttal which was distributed the following year by the American representative
of the Japan Whaling Association. That report emphasized the importance of whaling in
Japanese culture and attempted to draw parallels between Japanese coastal whaling and
aboriginal/subsistence whaling. See also BOREAL INSTITUTE FOR NORTHERN STUDIES, SMALL-
TYPE COASTAL WHALING IN JAPAN (1988). The issue of whether to create a special category
for coastal whaling operations remains unresolved.
87. Gibson, Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court's Review of
an Agency's Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society, 14 ECOLOGY L. Q., 509, 510 (1987).
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His observation has proven to be true in the case of both Iceland and
Norway as well.
The bilateral agreement made with Iceland last fall is discussed
above, but a major political issue which affected the negotiations has not
been discussed. Icelandic Foreign Minister Steingrumer Hermannsson
had indicated that Iceland would have to reassess its position on the
NATO base in Keflavik if the U.S. were to impose sanctions because of
whaling, and for a time construction activities were halted on the base."'
It seems that whales had very little chance when they were up against
NATO in the Reagan Administration. Most recently, this Administration
did not have the will to impose meaningful sanctions on Japan in the face
of outright defiance.
Having learned that U.S. sanctions were by no means certain, both
Norway and Iceland indicated that they would proceed with research
whaling programs in 1988. On June 22, the United States and Iceland
announced yet another bilateral deal despite the fact that the IWC had
reiterated its vote of the previous year." U.S. Commissioner Dr. William
Evans made a statement that Iceland had not met the requirements of
the previous resolution. He said,
The United States notes that the Resolution on the Icelandic Propo-
sal for Scientific Catches reiterates and reaffirms the recommenda-
tions adopted in the Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scien-
tific Catches adopted at the 1987 (39th) Commission meeting. To
ensure the effectiveness of the Commission's conservation program,
the government of Iceland is therefore being asked again to revoke
and refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals for the con-
duct of research programs until the uncertainties identified in the
1987 Scientific Committee Report (IWC/39/4) and now the 1988 Sci-
entific Committee Report (IWC/40/4) have been resolved to the satis-
faction of the Scientific Committee.9
There were, however, certainly indications that other considerations
would play a role in any decisions. Jerry Leach, a member of the National
Security Council, was included on the U.S. delegation. 1 On June 18, a
United States delegation went to Iceland to negotiate. Iceland agreed to
reduce its catch to 68 fin whales and 10 sei whales. The United States was
88. Iceland Intensifies Its Criticism of the U.S. : Conflict Over Whaling Grows, Ritzau
Bureau (Danish wire service), September 10, 1987 (translated); Research Whaling Goes On,
News from Iceland, October, 1987. The distribution list for cable traffic from the U.S. em-
bassy in Iceland giving translations of articles on whaling from the Icelandic press gives an
indication of how serious the threat was taken. It included the White House, the Com-
mander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, the Commander of the base at Keflavik, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the U.S. mission to NATO.
89. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 32 (1988) (statement of William Evans, United
States Commissioner to the International Whaling Commission, in seconding the Resolution
on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches).
90. Supra note 89.
91. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 3 (1988)(List of delegates).
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granted some scientific concessions, but the scientific uncertainties which
were resolved dealt only with the non-lethal aspects of the Icelandic re-
search proposal. The uncertainties identified for the lethal take were
never even broached and remained despite the two resolutions. The bilat-
eral agreement took the form of an exchange of letters between the Amer-
ican Ambassador and the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs.92
Perhaps it was not merely coincidental that on the same day as the
announcement of the bilateral agreement was made, Norway announced
that it would proceed with its research whaling program despite the pas-
sage of the resolution asking Norway to refrain from issuing its permits.9
As the record indicates, both the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly
amendments have been useful as negotiating tools in bringing countries
into compliance with IWC decisions. They have, however, been of only
limited utility when there has been a necessity to go beyond initial dis-
cussions or, as in the case of the Pelly Amendments, beyond initial certifi-
cation. However, as it becomes increasingly obvious that there is a hesi-
tancy to actually employ the sanctions' provisions, the leverage which
previously existed has been steadily eroded.
As long as discretion exists in the application of sanctions, political
considerations will play a heavy role. Representative Don Bonker warned
of this danger in 1981. He said, "Where the evidence justifies its applica-
tion, certification must not be held hostage to 'policy' considerations...
[t]he threat of these important amendments will continue to ring hollow
unless they are utilized in a nonpolitical manner." '94
As the laws are presently interpreted, discretion now exists for both
the initial certification and for actual sanctions. Under the Pelly amend-
ment, sanctions have always been totally discretionary. It was assumed
that the removal of discretion under the Packwood-Magnuson amend-
ment would solve this problem, but two things have happened limiting its
utility. First, the Americanization of the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone
has virtually eliminated quotas of fish available to foreign countries. Such
a scenario was clearly the goal of the Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act.95 Traditionally, there has been a significant TALFF (total al-
lowable level of foreign fishing) available for bottomfish in the North Pa-
cific. In 1988, for the first time the TALFF was zero.9' Obviously, the
92. Exchange of letters between U.S. Ambassador to Iceland L. Nicholas Ruwe and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland Steingrimur Hermannsson (June 22, 1988).
93. A coalition of environmental groups filed a challenge to this agreement in U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia on Aug. 3, 1988. See Greenpeace U.S.A., et at. v. C.
William Verity, Jr., et al., Civil action No. 88-2158 (GRH).
94. Bonker, U.S. Policy and Strategy in the International Whaling Commission: Sink-
ing or Swimming?, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 41, 52-53 (1982), as quoted in Zimmerman,
Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement: The Supreme Court Gives Credence to an Aberration in
American Cetacean Society III, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. R. 281 (1987).
95. 16 U.S.C. Secs. 1801-1882 (1988).
96. 50 Fed. Reg. 890-897 (1988). Later in the year an allocation of 12,000 metric tons of
Pacific cod did become available, and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council rec-
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leverage of limiting fish catches is no longer significant. If the Packwood-
Magnuson amendment had been used against Japan at the time of the
Baldrige-Murazumi Agreement, it could have represented an economic
loss of 500 million dollars.
Second, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whal-
ing Association v. American Cetacean Society97 the initial decision as to
whether to certify has similarly become discretionary. A coalition of envi-
ronmental groups filed suits asking that the Secretary of Commerce be
ordered to certify Japan at the time of the Baldrige-Murazumi Agree-
ment. The coalition won at both the district court and appellate court
levels,"8 but in a narrow 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower courts. Both the numerical margin and the legal
grounds were very narrow. The Court avoided addressing some major
Constitutional questions.9 The Court's decision was summarized in one
sentence on page eleven of the written opinion, which states: "[I]f a stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, our long-
standing practice is to defer to the 'executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer' unless the legislative
history of the enactment shows with sufficient clarity that the agency con-
struction is contrary to the will of Congress."1 ' Such a standard cannot
be totally objective. Ambiguity is sometimes in the eye of the beholder.
Certainly the author of the amendment felt that it applied to the particu-
lar situation being contested.' 1 Although the opinion stated that discre-
tion was not absolute, and the Secretary did not have carte blanche au-
thority to ignore violations, it gave no guidance as to what would be an
unreasonable exercise of discretion.'0 2
Gibson pointed out that the practical effect of the decision was to
give the discretion which existed for the President to the Secretary of
ommended that it be given to the Japanese North Pacific Longliner Association despite the
Packwood-Magnuson sanctions. After about a week of discussion, however, the proposal was
dropped. Council backs allowing Japanese in U.S. Waters, Anchorage Daily News, Oct. 4,
1988, at D-1 and D-2; Foreign Fleets Lose Backing, Anchorage Daily News, Oct. 5, 1988, at
D-1 and D-4.
97. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, supra note 40.
98. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, supra note 40.
99. The amicus curiae filed by the Joint Leadership of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives is particularly interesting in this respect. It highlights some major institutional ques-
tions and raises the question of whether the executive branch may overturn a statute by
means of an executive agreement which requires no congressional approval. See Brief of the
Joint Leadership of the House of Representatives in Baldrige, et al. v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, et al. (U. S. Supreme Court, 1985)(No. 85-954); and in Malcolm and Japan Whaling
Ass'n, et al. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, et al. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985) (No. 85-955).
100. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, supra note 40, at 233.
101. Letter from Senator Bob Packwood to Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
(June 28, 1984).
102. Further clarification of the limits of this discretion may result from the lawsuit
filed by 18 environmental organizations challenging the 1988 bilateral agreement. Green-
peace U.S.A., et al. v. C. William Verity, Jr. et al., supra note 90.
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Commerce.
[T]he Secretary in effect compensated for the power expressly re-
moved by the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment - the ability to nego-
tiate and compromise after certification - by establishing discretion to
negotiate and compromise in the pre-certification stage. The Secretary
with the Court's help thus created a loophole that effectively emascu-
lated the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment's self-executing sanctions
.... The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment's total effect is reduced
simply to providing the Secretary, rather than just the President, with
the power and discretion to impose sanctions."0 3
As the past five years have shown, there is difficulty in attempting to
enforce an international regulatory regime through the application of do-
mestic law. Inevitably, unilateral actions are either of limited utility or
create diplomatic friction. If an international regulatory regime is to be
truly effective, the contracting governments must surrender a degree of
individual sovereignty. Such a regime cannot have what amounts to a one
nation veto of the combined opinions of the other participating nations.
Further, there should be automatic enforcement provisions so that a deci-
sion to enforce is not projected into the political realm.
In the case of the IWC, we are faced with a Convention which cannot
regulate whaling without the application of U.S. laws and a U.S. govern-
ment which is sometimes reluctant to confront allies. Yet, the battle to
save the whales is likely to be decided in other fora. The Antarctic whal-
ing industry is no longer economically viable. Surprisingly, a recent article
on the Kyodo news-wire stated that an effort was being made to raise ten
million dollars in private contributions for Japan's "research" whaling op-
eration."0 4 Combined with an announced government subsidy of almost
three million dollars, it amounts to a subsidy of more than forty-three
thousand dollars per whale.
The pressure of public opinion is also likely to wear down the intran-
sigent nations. Eventually the cost to a nation's image abroad must be
weighed against the political advantage of maintaining a nonprofitable in-
dustry at home.
The story of the whales is a story of both the tragedy of the commons
and a symbol of hope. The structural defects in the International Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling are present in other conventions, and
we should be forewarned. It will be much more difficult to mount a cam-
paign to "Save the Cod."
103. Gibson, supra note 87, at 507-508.
104. Japan Seeking Donations to Fund Research Whaling, Kyodo News Service, Mar.
22, 1988.
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